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COMMENT

OHIO SUPREME COURT RULES OF
SUPERINTENDENCE FOR COURTS -OF'COMMON PLEAS
RULE 65: THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL-A
REALITY AT LAST?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In October of 1987, the Ohio Supreme Court took steps to ensure
that the poor need not face death merely because they can not afford to
retain experienced and adequate counsel.' Newly required levels of experience that counsel must have in order to be appointed to defend indigents who are charged with a capital crime or who are appealing a
death sentence are specified in the recent Amendments to Rule 65 of
the Supreme Court Rules of Superintendence for Courts of Common
Pleas.' Rule 65 is both an attempt to ensure that the right to effective
counsel is a reality for these indigent defendants and a mechanism for
dealing with the numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
which have arisen in recent years.
This comment first reviews the historic background of the right to
counsel and claims of ineffective assistance. Next, it examines the contents of Rule 65. Finally, this comment analyzes the potential effectiveness of Rule 65 in accomplishing the goal of providing counsel that is
adequate and experienced with regard to the special issues that are
often raised in death penalty cases.
II. BACKGROUND

No rule is enacted in a vacuum and presumably few rules are enacted without reason. Accordingly, it is in order to review the background of the issues around which Rule 65 revolves-the right to counsel and the standards for judging incompetent or ineffective assistance
of counsel.
1. Amendments to the Supreme Court Rules of Superintendence for Courts of Common
Pleas, OHIO ST. B.A. REP., Nov. 16, 1987 at A-16 [hereinafter Amendments].
2. C. P. Sup. R. 65, Ohio St. 3d (19-.) (a new rule added to the Supreme Court
Rules of Superintendencefor Courts of Common Pleas).
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History of the Right to Appointed Counsel

1. At Trial
In Powell v. Alabama,' the United States Supreme Court observed that "[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little
avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even
the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law."" While a statement such as this might seem selfevident in today's society, not everyone has always shared this understanding of the sixth amendment's guarantee and its implications on
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.5 In Powell, the Court
determined that in order to comply with due process requirements a
defendant in a capital case who is unable to retain counsel or adequately defend himself must have counsel appointed, regardless of
whether or not he requests such appointment. 6 Six years after Powell,
the Court stated in Johnson v. Zerbst7 that the sixth amendment "embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself
when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty,
wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel." 8 Ultimately, the Johnson Court held that all federal criminal defendants facing loss of life or liberty are entitled to counsel. 9 However,
it should be noted that in considering the right to counsel, the Johnson
Court's main focus was on the sixth amendment's constraint on federal
courts rather than the fourteenth amendment's constraint on state
courts.10
In Bute v. Illinois," the Court discussed the fourteenth amend-

3. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4. Id. at 68-69.
5. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution states that "[iln all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense" and the fourteenth amendment states that "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " In Powell, the Court held that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment embraced rights of a fundamental character and
therefore included the sixth amendment's right to counsel. Powell, 287 U.S. at 67-68. Under the
circumstances of the Powell case the Court determined that failure to provide counsel had resulted in a denial of the defendant's fourteenth amendment due process rights. Id at 71.
6. Id.
7. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
8. Id. at 462-63.
9. Id. at 462.
10. Id. at 463. The Court reasoned, "The sixth amendment withholds from federal courts,
in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty
unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel." Id. The court also noted that the burden of
proof was on the defendant to show that counsel was not intelligently waived. Id. at 468-69.
11. 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
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ment due process issue and ruled that although the procedure followed
by the state court in that case might not have been sufficient for a
federal court, "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment . . .does not say that no
state shall deprive any person of liberty without following the federal
process of law as prescribed for the federal courts in comparable federal cases."" Hence, at this juncture the Court was still only willing to
require that states appoint counsel when a defendant was charged with
a capital crime or when special circumstances were present.13
In Betts v. Brady,' the Court made an even stronger pronouncement, holding that the Constitution did not require that every person
who was charged with a serious crime in a state court be given the
assistance of counsel in all circumstances. 5 Later, though, the breadth
of the Betts holding was limited somewhat in Gibbs v. Burke 6 where
the Court emphasized that the Betts decision should not be read to
mean that counsel is never required to be appointed in noncapital state
cases. 7 The Gibbs Court cautioned that "[t]he due process clause is
not susceptible of reduction to a mathematical formula."' The Court
concluded that it is the duty of the trial judge to make certain that
there is a fair trial and that the defendant's rights are protected, since
only a review of all the facts and circumstances of each individual case
can show whether denial of counsel in a particular instance is "fundamentally unfair."' 19
Finally, in 1963 the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright" was
decided. Gideon was charged with a felony and was financially unable
to retain counsel." Under Florida law there was no provision for ap12. Id. at 649. The Court also noted, in dicta, that if the charges in Bute had been capital
charges, the trial court (even in the absence of an applicable state statute) would have been required to investigate as to the defendant's wish to have counsel, his ability to retain counsel, and if
the defendant could not retain counsel, the court would have had to appoint counsel. Id. at 674.
This requirement would seem to be even stricter than the one enunciated in Powell, since the
Court apparently did not find any special circumstances in Buie that rendered the defendant unable to represent himself. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 371 (1963) (Clark, J.,
concurring).
13. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
14. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Betts,
an indigent charged with robbery, was unable to obtain counsel for his defense, since applicable
state law only required appointment of counsel in cases where the defendant was charged with
murder or rape. Id. at 457.
15. Id. at 445.
16. 337 U.S. 773 (1949).
17. Id. at 780. The Court delineated some special circumstances such as "ignorance, youth,
or other incapacity .
that in the past had been found to require appointment of counsel. Id.
18. Id. at 781.
19. Id. The court found that under the circumstances of the Gibbs case the defendant was
not afforded a fair trial as a result of the lack of counsel and inadequate judicial guidance. Id.
20. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Published
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pointment of counsel under such circumstances and, thus, Gideon attempted to defend himself." The Court began its opinion by noting the
striking similarity between the facts in Gideon and those in Betts."
After reviewing the facts of Betts, the Gideon Court concluded that
Betts should be overruled.2 4 It was clear to the Gideon Court that if the
Betts Court had found that the appointment of counsel for a criminal
indigent defendant was a "'fundamental right, essential to a fair
trial,' "2 such appointment would have been required in state courts by
the fourteenth amendment, just as it is required by the sixth amendment in federal courts.2 6 The Court in Gideon disagreed with the conclusion in Betts regarding the fundamental nature of the right to counsel and held that the sixth amendment's right to counsel was applicable
to the states vis-a-vis the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.
The Court stressed that although "[t]he right of one charged with [a]
crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair
trials in some countries . . . it is in ours."' 28 Moreover, the Court noted
that it was "an obvious truth" that an indigent defendant charged with
a criminal act cannot obtain a fair trial without counsel. 9
2.

On Appeal

Even before its decision in Gideon, the Court took an important
step toward defining an indigent's rights on appeal in Griffin v. Illinois." The Griffin decision struck down an Illinois practice of only providing free trial transcripts for appeals to indigents who had been sentenced to death." The Court stated that "[i]n criminal trials a State
can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of
religion, race, or color. Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears

22. Id. Under Florida law a court could only appoint counsel for a capital defendant. Id.
23. Id. at 338. Like the defendant in Gideon, the defendant in Betts was unable to employ
counsel, had his request for appointed counsel denied, and unsuccessfully attempted to conduct his
own defense. Moreover, the defendant in Betts also claimed that he had been denied assistance of
counsel in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
24. Id. at 338-39.
25. Id. at 340 (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 471).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 342-43. The court discussed several earlier cases which had held that the right to
counsel is fundamental one. Id. at 342-43. Additionally, the court emphasized that "[n]ot only
these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." Id. at 344.
28. Id. at 344.
29. Id.
30. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
31. Id. All other defendants, whether indigent or not, were required to pay for trial tranhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/12
scripts. Id. at 14.
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no rational relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence ...."I'
The Court also held that although a state is not required to provide for
appellate review, if it does provide for such review, the review must be
provided on an equal basis for both the rich and the poor. 3
A California practice of reviewing the record prior to deciding
whether to appoint counsel for an indigent on an appeal of right was
struck down in Douglas v. California.3 The Court in Douglas reasoned
that this practice drew an "unconstitutional line" between those appellants who could afford counsel and those who could not.35 Under the
California rule a rich appellant's appeal would only be decided after

the submission of briefs in his favor and the presentation of an oral

argument. 36 Conversely, the indigent's appeal would, in most cases, be
denied unless the "barren record" spoke for the defendant or the

"printed pages" demonstrated that an injustice ha[d] befallen him."

The Douglas Court concluded that "[w]here
only appeal an indigent has as of right are
counsel in a state criminal case, there has
tween the rich and the poor which

Amendment."3 "
B.

the merits of the one and
decided without benefit of
been a discrimination beviolates the Fourteenth

An Overview of What has ConstitutedIncompetent Representation

Although it has generally been held that incompetence of counsel
is not grounds for a new trial where the defendant has employed his
own counsel, the rationale of this rule has no application in a case
where the defendant did not employ his own counsel.3 9 Thus, claims of

32. Id. at 17.
33. Id. at 18. However, the Court did not say that this meant a court must provide a complete transcript to every indigent. Other methods of reporting the proceedings could be used in
various cases. Id.
34. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
35. Id. at 357.
36. Id. at 356.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 353. The court later declined to extend Douglas' requirement that counsel be
appointed for indigents on their first appeal of right to discretionary appeals. Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U.S. 600, 617 (1974).
39. Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1945). The
general rule is that when the defendant employs counsel of his own choice "lack of skill and
incompetency of the attorney is imputed to the defendant . . . the acts of the attorney thus becoming those of his client" unless the defendant objects and lets the court know that he does not
agree. Id. at 98. However, if the "defendant is ignorant of his rights and unacquainted with the
course of proceedings in criminal cases" and his employed counsel's representation is so incompetent "as to amount practically to no representation" then the general rule does not apply. Id.
Where counsel is appointed, rather than chosen by the defendant, the underlying rationale for
viewing the acts of the attorney as those of the defendant does not seem to exist. Indeed, it is
arguable that even more stringent safeguards should be afforded the defendant with appointed
Published
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incompetence or ineffective assistance by counsel obviously have great
ramifications for the indigent defendant. In McMann v. Richardson,0
the United States Supreme Court observed that "[ilt has long been
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.""' Exactly what constitutes competent or effective
counsel, though, has been stated in different ways and put to different
tests in various courts. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
"interpret[ed] the right to counsel as the right to effective counsel...
not errorless counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight,
but counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance. ' 42 Such a pronouncement fails to provide a clear standard by which to judge the assistance of counsel. A more useful standard for judging effective assistance was offered by the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Scott v. United States.43 The Scott
court held that "[o]nly if it can be said that what was or was not done
by the defendant's attorney . . .made the proceedings a farce and a
mockery of justice, shocking to the conscience of the Court, can a
charge of inadequate legal representation prevail."""
The Ohio Supreme Court has found that counsel was effective
where "[he] performed conscientiously and, at least, as well as a lawyer
with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law." 4 5 Moreover, a
very functional two-part test for determining whether counsel's assistance was ineffective was applied by the Ohio Supreme Court in State
v. Lytle."' After noting that A.B.A. standards could be helpful, though
not the law of the state, the court held that the first step in examining
the competency of counsel was to determine "whether there has been a
substantial violation of any of defense counsel's essential duties to his
client." 4' 7 In the second, "analytically separate" step, the court must

40. 397 U.S. 754 (1970).
41. Id. at 771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added).
42. See MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960) (criticizing the districtcourt's appointment of an inexperienced attorney over the defendant's objection).
43. 334 F.2d 72 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 842 (1964)!
44. Id. at 73; see also Schaber v. Maxwell, 348 F.2d 664 (6th Cit. 1965); State v. Crutcher,
17 Ohio App. 2d 107, 244 N.E.2d 767 (1969). The court in Crutcher cited the standard that was
applied in Scott and said that "[elfficiency of counsel in a criminal trial implies skill and preparation in endeavoring to produce the desired result." Id. at 115, 244 N.E.2d at 771.
45. State v. Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 64-65, 358 N.E.2d 1062, 1073 (1976), overruled in
part as stated in State v. Downs, 51 Ohio St. 2d 47, 364 N.E.2d 1140 (1977), cert. granted, 434
U.S. 889 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). The court also noted that counsel's
failure to make objections was not a reversible error, merely because they may seem to have been
inappropriate in hindsight. Id. at 64, 358 N.E.2d at 1073.
46. 48 Ohio St. 2d. 391, 358 N.E.2d 623 (1976).
47. Id. at 396, 358 N.E.2d at 627. With regard to the A.B.A. standards, the Ohio Supreme
Court reasoned that it was "misleading to decide an issue of competency by using, as a measuring
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/12
rod, only those criteria defined as the best of available practice in the defense field." Id.
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decide if "the defense was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness. '"48
This two-part test is similar to the test that was ultimately developed
and applied by the United States Supreme Court eight years later.49
In two companion cases, decided in 1984, the United States Supreme Court provided some guidelines for how lower courts should
judge claims of incompetent or ineffective assistance. In United States
v. Chronic,50 the Court recognized that "'[o]f all the rights that an
accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the
most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he
may have.'"' Although the Court admitted that in some circumstances prejudice to the defendant is so likely that a court could infer
that there was ineffective assistance,5 2 the Court nonetheless reversed
the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit which inferred ineffective assistance from the facts of the Chronic case, instead
of presuming competence and requiring proof of "an actual breakdown
of the adversarial process . ... 1
Following the Chronic decision, in Strickland v. Washington,54 the
Court set out the general parameters of what a defendant must prove
in order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
Court stated that it must first be determined whether "counsel's performance was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the sixth amendment. ' 55 However, the Court
cautioned that it is not enough to merely show such erred performance;
the defendant must also "show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires a showing that counsel's errors
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable. ' 56 The Court stressed that the review of counsel's per-

48. Id. at 396-97, 358 N.E.2d at 627. The court observed that licensed counsel will be
presumed to be competent, and the defendant will bear the burden of proving otherwise. Id. at
397, 358 N.E.2d at 627.
49. See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (discussing the standard for ineffective
counsel set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
50. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
51. Id. at 654 (quoting Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 1,8 (1956)).
52. Id. at 658. Some examples of such circumstances are situations involving a complete
denial of counsel or situations where counsel "entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to
meaningful adversarial testing." Id. at 659.
53. Id. at 652-53, 657-59, 662 (emphasizing that "only when surrounding circumstances
justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial.").
54. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
55. Id. at 687.
56. Id.
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formance must be "highly deferential" and that "every effort [should]
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight . . . and to
evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time."5
Thus, over the last half century courts have sought to define the
boundaries of the right to effective assistance of counsel and it is
against this backdrop that Rule 65 was written.
C.

Overview of the Rule

Rule 65 delineates the qualifications that an attorney must possess
in order to be appointed as counsel for an indigent who is charged with
a capital crime or who is appealing a death sentence. According to the
comments of the committee that drafted Rule 65, the qualifications for
appointments closely parallel the qualifications "by the Ohio Public
Defender Commission set out in Ohio Admin. Code 120-1-10."58 However, the Ohio Public Defender standards are not mandatory on the
courts, whereas Ohio Supreme Court standards are mandatory. 9
Section I of Rule 65 is divided into requirements for appointed
trial counsel and appointed appellate counsel. At both the trial and appellate levels, the appointed counsel must "[b]e admitted to the Ohio
Bar or admitted to practice pro hac vice." 6 At the trial level, at least
two attorneys must be appointed for an indigent charged with a capital
crime and at least one of them must have an Ohio law office and Ohio
criminal trial experience."' The "lead counsel" must have three years
of criminal or civil litigation experience, some special training in de-

57. Id. at 689.
58. Amendments, supra note 1, at A-18. Although OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 120-1-10 (1988)
is substantially similar to C. P. Sup. R. 65, there are some distinctions worth noting. Section 1201-10 sets out qualifications that appointed counsel must meet in order for a county to seek reimbursement for defense costs from the Ohio Public Defender Commission. Additionally, the OHIO
ADMIN. CODE does not have a separate requirements parallel to C. P. Sup. R. 65 § I(A)(2)(b) nor
to § I(A)(2)(c). Id. These sections in C. P. Sup. R. 65 require that lead trial counsel, in addition
to meeting other requirements must "[h]ave at least three years of litigation experience, criminal
or civil; and . . . [hiave had some specialized training in the defense of persons accused of capital
crimes". C. P. Sup. R. 65 §§ (A)(2)(b), l(A)(2)(c). The qualifications required for trial level cocounsel are the same in both C. P. Sup. R. 65 § I(A)(3) and OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 120-110(A)(1)(c). The qualifications to be met by appellate counsel are the same in both C. P. Sup. R.
65 §§ I(B)(1)-(2) and OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 120-1-10(A)(6)(a)-(b). Exceptions allowing counsel
to be appointed even if they do not meet the requirements are substantially similar in both C. P.
Sup. R. 65 and OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 120-1-10. C. P. Sup. R. 65 §§ I(A)(4), I(B)(3); OHIO
ADMIN. CODE § 120-1-10 (A)(1)(d), (A)(6)(c).

59.
60.
hac vice
1979).
61.

Amendments, supra note 1, at A-18.
C. P. Sup. R. 65 §§ (A)(2)(a), I(A)(3)(a), l(B)(2)(a). To be admitted to practice pro
is to be admitted to practice for this occasion. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1091 (5th ed.
C. P. Sup. R. 65 § (A)(I).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/12
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fending capital defendants, and at least one of the four following
qualifications:
i. Experience as "lead counsel" in the jury trial of at least one capital
case;
ii. Experience as "co-counsel" in the trial of at least two capital cases;
iii. Experience as "co-counsel" in the trial of a capital case; and
- Experience as "lead counsel" in the jury trial of at least one murder or aggravated murder case; or
- Experience as "lead counsel" in ten or more criminal or civil jury
trials, at least three of which were felony jury trials; or
iv. Experience as "lead counsel" in at least:
- Three murder or aggravated murder jury trials; or
- One murder or aggravated murder jury trial and three felony jury
trials; or
- Three aggravated or first- or second-degree felony jury trials in a
Common Pleas Court within the past three years, at6 2 least one of
which shall have involved a charge of a violent crime.
These qualifications for "lead counsel" are more stringent than those
required for "co-counsel".
"Co-counsel" at the trial level must meet one of six qualifications:
i. Qualify as "lead counsel" under (A)(2) above;
ii. Experience as "lead" or "co-counsel" in a capital case;
iii. Experience as "co-counsel" in one murder or aggravated murder
trial;
iv. Experience as "lead counsel" in one first-degree felony jury trial;
v. Experience as "lead" or "co-counsel" in at least two felony jury or
civil jury trials in Common Pleas Court; or
vi. Specialized training in the defense of persons accused of capital
crimes."
Thus, Rule 65 provides an indigent capital defendant not only with experienced "lead counsel" but also with experienced "co-counsel."
The appellate counsel provisions also require that two attorneys be
appointed where "the court has ordered the death penalty and where
trial counsel has been granted leave to withdraw or supplemental counsel is being appointed." 6 ' In an appellate case, both attorneys must
have "adequate criminal appellate, post-conviction, or habeas corpus
experience . ...

*-

While only one of the attorneys must have an

Ohio law office, both attorneys must have three years of litigation expe-

62. Id. § I(A)(2)(d).
63. Id. § I(A)(3). The rule also provides that counsel not meeting the qualifications may
still be appointed if the committee is satisfied that competent representation will be provided. Id. §
l(A)(4).
Published
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rience in addition to either experience as counsel in the appeal of a
capital case or experience as counsel in the appeal of at least three
felony convictions within the past three years along with special training in appeal of capital cases."'
Rule 65 also creates a Committee on the Appointment of Counsel

(Appointment Counsel) for Indigent Defendants in Capital Cases and
specifies the selection of committee members, eligibility for membership, terms, powers, duties, and various other details of the committee."7 According to the subcommittee comments, the AppointmentI
Committee will compile, update, and distribute lists of attorneys eligible for appointment. 8
In its final section, Rule 65 outlines the procedures that must be
followed in appointing counsel. 9 This section requires that counsel be
appointed in capital cases for indigent defendants in accordance with
Section I, yet it allows local rules to provide additional qualifications.7 0
Additionally, no appointment should be made or accepted which creates an excessive workload which would prevent counsel from providing

quality representation.7 1 The appointing court must notify the Appointment Committee of appointments and of the final disposition of the
72
case.
III.

ANALYSIS

Rule 65 evolved out of concerns on the part of the Ohio Supreme
Court 73 and practitioners who were often involved with death penalty

66. Id. §§ I(B)(l), I(B)(2). As with trial counsel, the rule provides for exceptional circumstances, in which counsel not meeting these qualifications may still be appointed. Id. § l(B)(3).
67. Id. § II.
68. Amendments, supra note 1, at A-20-21. The performance of appointed counsel will also
be monitored by the Appointment Committee. Id.
69. C. P. Sup. R. 65 § III.
70. Id. § Ill(A). This section states:
All municipal county, common pleas, and appellate courts within the State shall appoint
counsel to represent indigent defendants charged with a capital offense in accordance with
Section I of this Rule. Each court shall be free to adopt local rules requiring qualifications
in addition to the minimum requirements established by this Rule.
Id.
71. Id. According to this section "[tlhe appointing court shall not assign, and counsel shall
not accept, an appointment which creates a total workload so excessive that it interferes with or
effectively prevents the rendering of quality representation in accordance with constitutional and
.professional standards." Id. The subcommittee comments refer to excessive workloads as'the
greatest obstacle in providing quality services for indigents. Amendments, supra note 1, at A-16,
A-23.
72. C. P. Sup. R. 65 § Ill(B). The final section of the rule also allows courts to provide
appointed counsel with certain support services such as investigators, forensic experts, and mental
health professionals, as provided for by both state and federal law. Id. § Il(C).
73. Letter from Justice Douglas, Ohio Supreme Court, to Randall M. Dana, State Public
Defender (June 18, 1986) [hereinafter Douglas Letter] (on file with University of Dayton Law
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/12
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cases. 7 4 There was a generalized recognition that capital cases were different from noncapital cases75 and a mounting perception that there
had been too many reversals of death sentences based on findings of
ineffective assistance. 76 In response to these concerns a subcommittee of
the Ohio State Bar's Criminal Justice Committee drafted Rule 65 and
submitted it to the Executive Committee for approval." The Executive
Committee approved Rule 65 and shortly thereafter presented it to the
Ohio Supreme Court where the rule was formally adopted in October
of 1987.7
The rule sets out in detail the qualifications that an attorney must
have either to be appointed as counsel for an indigent defendant
charged with a capital crime or to be appointed as counsel for an indigent who is appealing a death sentence. 79 Basically these qualifications
attempt to ensure that the appointed counsel is at least moderately experienced in dealing with the issues that commonly arise in capital
cases or appeals from death sentences. The necessity of appointing experienced counsel in such cases has been expressed by several Ohio
courts. In State v.. Williams,8" the Trumball County Court of Appeals
stated that "[a]s a matter of policy, we feel that a trial court should
avoid appointing inexperienced attorneys to represent defendants indicted for serious offenses." 8 1 Similarly, in State v. Toney 2 the Mahoning County Court of Appeals observed not only that courts should refrain from appointing inexperienced counsel on appeals, but also that it
was "the obligation of experienced criminal practitioners to accept appointment to represent indigent defendants in appeals."" a Clearly, these
courts recognized the need for experienced counsel. Unfortunately
there was no assurance that all Ohio courts would recognize and appreciate this need. By adopting Rule 65, which is mandatory for all Ohio

Review). Justice Douglas' letter begins by voicing concerns about the questions raised by State v.
Johnson, 24 Ohio St. 3d 87, 494 N.E.2d 1061 (1986). Douglas Letter, supra, at 1. He suggests
that "a procedure for training and selecting capital crime case counsel should be developed . . .
and, if appropriate, be submitted to this court for consideration. Possibly this court could then
adopt rules and/or guidelines . . . and thereby avoid, for the most part, charges that appointed
counsel was not effective." Id. 1-2.
74. Telephone interview with John Rion, Co-chairman of the Ohio State Bar Criminal Justice Committee (Feb. 8, 1988) [hereinafter Rion Interview] (on file with University of Dayton
Law Review).
75. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
76. Rion Interview, supra note 74; see also infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
77. Rion Interview, supra note 74.
78. Id.
79. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
80. 19 Ohio App. 2d 234, 250 N.E.2d 907 (1969).
81. Id. at 237, 250 N.E.2d at 911.
82. 23 Ohio'App. 2d 203, 262 N.E.2d 419 (1970).
83. Id. at 206, 262 N.E.2d at 422.
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courts, the Ohio Supreme Court provided such an assurance. 4 Furthermore, with Rule 65's detailed guidelines there is no question as to what
constitutes "experienced counsel." Mandatory application of standardized requirements promotes a more equal and uniform operation of
Ohio's criminal justice system. Rule 65 assures that an indigent in one
jurisdiction in Ohio charged with a capital crime or appealing a capital
sentence will receive counsel with experience comparable to the counsel
provided in any other Ohio jurisdiction.
In light of Justice Clark's concurring opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright, 5 Rule 65 could be criticized for applying only to defendants
who are either facing or appealing a death sentence. Justice Clark
stressed that "the Constitution makes no distinction between capital
and noncapital cases." 86 However, Rule 65 affords capital and noncapital defendants with the same constitutional rights. All defendants, capital and noncapital alike, will still receive their right to effective counsel.
The fact that Rule 65 specifically delineates the necessary qualifications of counsel appointed for indigent capital defendants should not be
construed to mean that indigent noncapital defendants may be denied
effective and experienced counsel by the courts of Ohio.
Rule 65 is an honest recognition that death penalty cases raise
unique problems or issues." Ohio is trying to assure that indigent defendants in capital cases will be adequately defended by experienced
attorneys capable of dealing with the complex issues raised in a capital
case. Capital cases involve special considerations as a result certain
procedures which are often unique to the capital case such as bifurcated trials, presentation of mitigating evidence, and review by appellate courts of the proportionality and reliability of the sentence.88 The
drafting committee's comments note that although "counsel [may be]
quite able to try a complex criminal case [he] may not be competent to
handle a penalty trial in a capital case." 89 It is painfully obvious that
once a death sentence has been carried out there can be no correction

84. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
85. 372 U.S. 335, 347 (1963) (Clark, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 349. Justice Clark also observed that the proposition that "deprival of liberty may
be less onerous than deprival of life [is] a value judgement not universally accepted." Id. (Clark,
J., concurring).
87. See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 303-04 (1983). Professor Goodpaster contends that "[tirials about
life differ radically in form and in issues addressed from those about the commission of a crime,
and the cases must be treated differently." Id. at 303.
88. See id.
89. Id. The Drafting Committee comments note that Rule 65's qualifications for appointed
counsel are intended to reduce the risk of erroneous convictions and death sentences. Amendments, supra note 1, at A-16, A-18.
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made if error is found, no pardon, not even any commutation. In his
concurrence in Ake v. Oklahoma,90 Justice Burger stressed that "[in
capital cases the finality of the sentence imposed warrants protections
91
that may or may not be required in other cases."
Another concern that prompted the adoption of Rule 65 was the
growing perception that too many reversals occurred in death penalty
cases because of claims of ineffective assistance, particularly at the
penalty phase.9 2 An illustrative case is State v. Johnson.9" In Johnson,
the Ohio Supreme Court found that the defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel had been denied and therefore reversed his conviction, vacated his death sentence, and remanded the case.9 4 The court
stated that defendant's counsel had been unprepared for the penalty
phase and that he presented no mitigating evidence as a result of his
failure to investigate the defendant's background.9 5 In fact, the court
noted that the only "'evidence' . . . heard by the jury was a lengthy
unsworn statement by appellant protesting his innocence, followed by a
closing argument . . actually berating the jurors for their guilty verdict and repeatedly urging them to 'reconsider the evidence.' "9 The
court reasoned that there was a difference between making a tactical
decision not to present mitigating evidence and failing to comply with
the duty to investigate the defendant's background to see if there was
mitigating evidence.97
In a case from the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
Blake v. Kemp,9 8 an attorney's alleged ineffective assistance at the penalty phase was analyzed using the standard set forth in Strickland v.
Washington.99 Blake's attorney testified in a later hearing that "he
made no preparations whatsoever for the penalty phase . . . because he
believed that Blake would be found not guilty by reason of insanity. It
was his philosophy that a lawyer should try 'to win [a case] rather than

90. 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985) (Burger, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 87 (Burger, J., concurring). In Ake the Court held that "when a defendant has
made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant
factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a state provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on
this issue, if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one." Id. at 74.
92. Rion Interview, supra note 74.
93. 24 Ohio St. 3d 87, 494 N.E.2d 1061 (1986).
94. Id. at 88, 494 N.E.2d at 1063.
95. Id. at 90-91, 494 N.E.2d at 1064.
96. Id.
97. Id. Defense counsel also failed to object either at the guilt phase or the penalty phase of
the trial to a specification in the indictment that was not one of the statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstances allowed to be considered in imposing a death sentence. Id. at 92-93, 494
N.E.2d at 1065-66.
98. 758 F.2d 523 (1lth Cir. 1985).
99. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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prepare for losing it.' "100 Applying the Strickland standard, the court
found that Blake's deficiencies as counsel satisfied the first step of the
test and concluded that "an attorney who fails altogether to make any
preparations for the penalty phase of a capital murder trial deprives his
client of reasonably effective assistance of counsel by any objective
standard of reasonableness." 1" 1 Even with this rather clear example of
ineffective assistance, however, it was still necessary for the court to
proceed to the second step of the Strickland standard. This step requires the defendant to show that his counsel's deficient performance
resulted in prejudice to his defense. °2 In evaluating Kemp's claim of
prejudice to his defense the Court of Appeals considered whether there
was a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome."' 10 3 Ultimately, the court concluded that the defendant
had met his burden of showing he had been prejudiced since there was
"a reasonable probability that he would have received a lesser sentence" had his attorney sought any mitigating evidence."'
Rule 65 also addresses another problem faced by appointed counsel-the potential decline in effectiveness due to excessive workload. 0 5
In King v. Strickland,06 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
examined the problem of how excessive workloads can lessen an attorney's effectiveness. As a result of various circumstances, the most pervasive one being that the lead counsel had just completed a large and
consuming trial which had left him exhausted, the court found that the
defendant in King had received ineffective assistance at the penalty
phase of his trial. 0 7 Even though counsel's condition was mainly discussed in the court's review of the guilt phase of the trial,' 0 8 such a
severely impaired condition undoubtedly lessened counsel's effectiveness
throughout all phases of the trial. Yet, the court said that even though
the testimony as to counsel's condition "[gave] it some pause . . . . A
tired lawyer is not necessarily an ineffective lawyer."' 0 9 It may be true
that a tired lawyer can still be an effective lawyer. But it is equally true
that as an attorney's level of exhaustion goes up, the possibility of him

100. Blake, 758 F.2d at 533.
101. Id. at 533.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
104. Id. at 534.
105. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
106. 714 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1983).'
107. Id. at 1486-91.
108. Id. at 1486.
109. Id. at 1487.
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being truly effective in defending his client must go down. Rule 65's
concern about excessive workload is warranted.
While Rule 65 has many potential benefits, there are also a number of concerns about the rule that deserve consideration as well. First,
in order for any rule to be effective, it must be followed. After delineating the requirements for "lead counsel," "co-counsel," and appellate
counsel, 110 Rule 65 provides for exceptional circumstances whereby an
attorney who fails to meet these requirements may still be appointed as
counsel.' The rule provides that "[i]f an attorney does not meet the
qualification requirements . . . the attorney may still be court-appointed . . . if it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the majority of the Committee . . .that competent representation will be provided to the defendant." ' 1 2 Those familiar with past practices of judges
appointing counsel based on political, personal, or independent criteria,
may be concerned about this exception to Rule 65. Clearly, the breadth
of the aforementioned exception is quite extensive in that the committee is given a non-exclusive list of criteria to consider when making
such an exception." 3 However, it should be noted that this discretion is
not placed in the hands of individual judges, but in the hands of the
independent Appointment Committee."" Thus, Rule 65 does provide
some safeguards which should prevent possible abuse of the exceptional
circumstances provision of the rule.
A second concern relates to how Rule 65 will affect future claims
of ineffective assistance by counsel. Justice Douglas expressed the hope
that by instituting such a rule, Ohio could "avoid, for the most part,
charges that appointed counsel was not effective."" 5 The National Legal Aid and Defender Association has recognized that "the right of
many indigent capital defendants to a lawyer sufficiently skilled in

110. C. P. Sup. R. 65 §§ I(A)(2), I(A)(3), I(B)(2).
111. Id. §§ I(A)(4), I(B)(3).
112. Id.
113. Id. Both of the "exceptional circumstances" sections direct the Appointment Committee to consider experience, special training and "[a]ny other relevant considerations." Id.
114. Id.; see also supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. In order to ensure that the
committee is independent, qualified, and diverse, selection criteria, eligibility requirements, and
overall composition of the committee is strictly regulated by C. P. Sup. R. 65 § I1.Of the five
committee members, "[t]hree ... shall be selected by a majority vote of . . .the Supreme Court
of Ohio; one . . . by the Ohio State Bar Association; and one . . .by the Ohio Public Defender
Commission." Id. § II(A)(l). In addition to certain eligibility requirements of legal background
no member of the committee is to hold the office of prosecuting attorney or other similar office. Id.
§ II(A)(2). Finally, in order to guarantee a diverse makeup in the overall composition of the
committee, the rule provides: "No more than three members shall be registered members of the
same political party; No more than two members shall reside in the same county; and No more
than one shall be a judge." Id. § II(A)(3).
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practice to render quality assistance is not being fulfilled."' 1 6 Logically,
requiring counsel to meet certain standards in order to be appointed to
represent indigent capital defendants should increase the quality of
counsel provided, and thereby result in a corresponding decrease in the
number of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, it would
be most unfortunate if a rule to help indigent capital defendants was
used in the future to foreclose the possibility of successful claims of
ineffective assistance by the very defendants it was designed to protect.
Certainly, it can be expected that the number of meritorious claims of
ineffective assistance will decrease. Yet, even the committee which
drafted Rule 65 noted that the rule must not be used as a rubber stamp
measure; declaring all counsel appointed according to the requirements
to have been effective counsel regardless of the circumstances or merits
of an individual case." 7 A defendant must still have the opportunity to
prove that his counsel failed to provide effective assistance as judged by
the Strickland standard. "1 8
IV.

CONCLUSION

Rule 65 recognizes the principles developed throughout the history
of the right to counsel. The Rule seeks to ensure that indigents charged
with a capital crime or appealing from a death sentence will find that
the right to effective assistance of counsel truly provides effective assistance, rather than just a mere promise of effective assistance. Presumably, requiring appointed counsel to meet high standards will help not
only to reduce the number of reversals based on ineffective assistance,
but also to reduce the number of ineffective assistance claims that will
need to be brought. Attorneys with more experience will be better
equipped to handle the intricacies of capital trials and appeals. Although Rule 65 is not without its difficulties, such a rule is a step toward making the right to effective counsel a reality for indigent capital
defendants.
Paula Lynne Wilson

116. National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Standards for the Appointment and
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Dec. 1, 1987) (on file with University of Dayton
Law Review).
117. Amendments, supra note 1, at A-16, A-18.
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118. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.

